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THESIS

**MAKING DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR THE WORLD: A
GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF ELITES
ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS**

by

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December 2008

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**MAKING DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR THE WORLD:
A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF ELITES ON THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS**

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ABSTRACT

The United States has made the spread of democracy one of its foreign policy pillars. Partial conflict analysis presents a means for examining the democratization process and developing an optimized solution in order to achieve this goal. This thesis explores two approaches to democratization: top-down and bottom-up. A top-down approach begins by building civic identity through the establishment of liberal institutions that foster democratic ideals at the national level and propagate down to the individual. A bottom-up approach begins by developing social capital within individuals, continues by forming civic and political associations, and culminates in a national, democratic identity. Each avenue exhibits unique strengths and weaknesses and its effectiveness is measured using eight criteria. In democratization, national elites represent the most significant variable due to their power and influence. Elites fall into two categories: self-oriented and servant-oriented. Based on game theory analysis, transitioners favor the top-down approach, servant-oriented elites favor accepting democracy, and self-oriented elites favor rejecting democracy. Analysis predicts that democratization will succeed whenever transitioners encounter sufficient servant-oriented elites (35%) to induce national elite support. Where servant-oriented elites are inadequate, transitioners must boost their influence, or offer incentives to obtain elite support. Otherwise, attempts at democratization will likely fail.

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I. THE IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF DEMOCRATIZATION

A. THE STRATEGY OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Over the past eight years, the process of installing and promoting democratic regimes in foreign nations, or democratization, has become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. On March 16, 2006, President Bush issued a revised National Security Strategy stating that it is U.S. policy to “seek and support democratic movements” in hopes of “[creating] a world of democratic, well-governed states” (United States & President (2001- : Bush), 2006). According to this strategy, democracy is “viewed as a tool to end tyranny and fight terrorism, as the way to promote stability in troubled regions, and as a mechanism to increase prosperity in poor countries” (Epstein, Serafino, Miko, Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2007, p. 1). The United States is currently working to execute this strategy of democratization. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claims that democratization has become a priority because “that is the mission that President Bush has set for America in the world” (Epstein et al., 2007).

A democratization strategy is not cheap. From September 2001 through the end of fiscal year 2007, the cost of democratization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has exceeded \$604 billion. Expenditures for fiscal year 2008 and 2009 are expected to be about \$226 billion, and total spending for 2001-2017 is projected to amount to between \$1.2 trillion and \$1.7 trillion (Belasco, Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2008; Orszag, United States, & Congressional Budget Office, 2007).¹ Moreover, these figures do not account for immeasurables such as the loss of human life or the impact on the international community. In fiscal year 2008, the United States requested over \$1.5 billion for

¹ Since democratization is the primary objective of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, all operations within the two nations were included in calculating these costs.

democracy promotion activities, mostly through the Department of State (Epstein et al., 2007, p. 19). On the other hand, the cost of failed democracies is also inestimably high. The long-term expense of countering and stabilizing failed states can easily exceed even the highest democratization price tag. The key to successfully spreading democracy lies in developing a more effective and more efficient approach to the democratization process. Such an improvement can aid in the completion of U.S. foreign policy, reduce the cost of the policy, and help avoid a failed transition.

B. OPTIMIZING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

For decades, scholars have debated over the most effective approach to installing a democratic regime, and a consensus does not appear attainable in the near future. Recent attempts at democratization have shown the process to be increasingly difficult and have left many questions unanswered. Chief among them is the question: “How can one maximize the probability of instituting a stable, democratic government while minimizing intrastate violence and the possibility of internal collapse?”

This discussion will attempt to answer that question, and it hypothesizes that the solution can be found by analyzing the partial conflict between transitioners (those installing democracy) and national elites (those that wield power at the national level). First, transitioners must develop and sequence their approach to the democratization process to suit the scenario at hand. Second, transitioners must consider the means and motivations of elites. Finally, transitioners must analyze the partial conflict between these two parties in order to select the best course of action and predict the likely outcomes. While the results of this discussion may not present a comprehensive solution, they will provide additional insight into the problem, bringing everyone closer to an optimized democratization process.

C. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW

Overall, this discussion will take an inductive approach, using a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods. It will attempt to frame quantitatively the democratization process and the actions of national elites in order to analyze their interactions in a game of partial conflict. The results of this analysis will point to new methods for optimizing the democratization process. The following sections provide a brief overview of each chapter.

Chapter II begins by developing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a newly installed democracy using methodologies similar to Freedom House. It then utilizes the research of numerous respected scholars to piece together inductively two avenues to democratization. Depending upon the unique circumstances of the target nation, each avenue exhibits distinctive strengths and weaknesses, all of which must be considered.

Chapter III explores the basic motivations of national elites in an effort to predict their responses to the democratization process. It continues by dividing elites into various categories based on the broad desires that motivate each group. Lastly, the chapter leverages the research of psychologist Steven Reiss to develop generalized personality profiles that codify the more specific wants and desires of each type. These desired profiles are then used to predict the actions of national elites.

Chapter IV uses the findings from the previous two chapters to frame the democratization process as a game of partial conflict between transitioners and national elites. It examines the possible results of each scenario, develops utility payouts for each outcome, and organizes these payouts into a payout matrix. Each utility payout represents the general satisfaction received by a player for a given outcome. The chapter then analyzes this matrix to determine dominant strategies, likely outcomes, strategic moves, and optimal solutions. Lastly, it repeats this analysis in a multi-party environment where multiple varieties of national elites are present simultaneously.

Chapter V examines the analysis from Chapter IV in an effort to extrapolate any generalized conclusions that may be applied to all democratization scenarios. It also outlines areas that should be investigated for further research. Hopefully, these findings can be examined and applied by the United States and help to bring about a smoother and swifter completion to its policy of global democratization.

II. METRICS AND AVENUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

According to Alain Touraine, a famous French sociologist, “the sovereignty of the people paves the way to democracy” (Touraine, 1997, p. 21). But the word democracy has many meanings, and as history illustrates, not all democracies achieve equal success. This chapter begins by developing a definition of the word democracy and identifying the traits exhibited by all democracies. Next, it develops a list of metrics for evaluating a democracy and assigns numerical values to each criterion, based on its relative importance to the overall effectiveness of a democratic government. Lastly, it leverages the works of other scholars to develop two avenues for installing a democratic regime in a target nation. Chapter IV then pairs these avenues against the reactions of various national elite and evaluates the success and/or failure of democratization using the developed criteria.

A. A DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY

Because there is considerable academic debate on the characteristics of a democracy, it is important first to establish a definition of the term. The word *democracy* is derived from classical Greek, meaning rule (*Xratos*) by the people (*demos*) (Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003, p. 15). Political scientists Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl pose the following definition:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (1996, p. 50).

To this definition, Samuel Huntington also adds:

It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns (1991, p. 7).

Touraine provides a simpler definition stating that democracies provide “the freedom of the ruled to choose their rulers at regular intervals” (1997, p. 26). However, he further explains that rulers in a democracy must wield limited power and they must be representative of voters. Additionally, these voters must regard themselves as citizens of a nation and the composition of the citizenry should remain continuous throughout the democratization process. In other words, it should be clear to voters as to which political entity they belong (Rustow, 1969, p. 350-351).

Norberto Bobbio provides one additional that should also be included in this discussion. He claims that democracy must be defined by “a set of rules which establish who is authorized to take collective decisions and which procedures are to be used” (Bobbio & Bellamy, 1987, p. 24). These procedures are usually recorded in the form of a constitution.

In review, a democracy revolves around substantial voter participation in fair, regular, and competitive elections that provide citizens with the ability to select rulers and impose accountability upon them. In addition, democratic institutions that provide the means for political debate, such as freedom to speak and assemble, must also be present. Furthermore, these procedures should be delineated and protected in the form of a constitution. While this definition has not achieved complete consensus in academic circles, it does agree with definitions posed by other notable scholars (Dahl, 1982; Diamond, 1999; Epstein, Serafino, Miko, Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 2007; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 11; Snyder, 2000, p. 26; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Linz, 1975, pp. 182-183).

B. MEASURING DEMOCRACY

Regular, competitive elections, and the democratic institutions required to facilitate these elections, represent the minimum standard for all democracies. However, not all democracies are created equal and some regimes surpass this basic level. Other characteristics, such as the rule of law and minority rights,

contribute to the strength and effectiveness of a democracy, enabling a government to exceed these minimum levels. These attributes may be present in varying degrees, and while their absence does not deny a government its democratic status, their presence does contribute to its overall success and stability as a democracy.

Within the definition of a democracy, Larry Diamond identifies two subtypes: electoral and liberal. These subtypes represent opposite ends of a continuum in which all defined democracies exist. According to Diamond, an electoral democracy takes a minimalist view of democracy and is described as “a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” (Diamond, 1999, p. 10). Only the minimum levels of freedom are required in order for competition and participation to be meaningful. On the other hand, a liberal democracy employs a “thick context of liberal institutions” (Snyder, 2000, p. 317) to protect individual and group liberties and insulate civil society and private life from state control. Under a liberal democracy, all citizens possess political and legal equality and the state, as well as its agents, are held accountable under the law (Diamond, 1999, pp. 10-12). In short, an electoral democracy barely meets the proposed minimum definition while a liberal democracy represents a mature and consolidated democracy that is highly effective and incredibly stable.

To properly evaluate the effectiveness of a democracy and its position on the electoral-liberal continuum, the regime must be measured against a proven set of quantitative grading criteria. One possible fit is the criteria developed by Freedom House, a non-profit organization that promotes the spread of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law around the world through analysis, advocacy and action (*“About Us,”* 2008). The mission statement of Freedom House claims:

Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to their own people, the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, belief and respect for the rights of minorities and women are guaranteed (*"About Us,"* 2008).

Because the prerequisites for freedom, as defined by Freedom House, are so closely correlated with the effectiveness of a democracy, the metrics used to evaluate one may also be applied to the other. Diamond agrees with this approach, claiming Freedom House provides "the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy" (Diamond, 1999, p. 12).

Each year Freedom House conducts its "Freedom of the World" survey, and measures the performance of governments and the protection of freedom around the globe in seven sub-categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (*"Methodology,"* 2008). These sub-categories also provide a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a democracy. The following sections represent a detailed look at each of these sub-categories.

1. Electoral Process

This sub-category addresses the presence of elections and the fairness of the electoral framework. In an effective democracy, the people must have the ability to select their nation's leadership in an open and transparent forum. Elections should be independently monitored and executed in a timely manner, free from government pressure. Voters must be free from intimidation and voter registration must be non-discriminatory. If a nation's chief national authority and national legislature are both selected through elections that are deemed free and fair, then the electoral process is deemed sufficient (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Dahl, 1982, p. 11; Touraine, 1997). Furthermore, the losers of an election must

respect the rights of the winner and accept defeat (Schmitter & Karl, 1996, p. 56). A government that fits the proposed definition of a democracy will score well in this sub-category.

2. Political Pluralism and Participation

Ideally, a democracy should strive for political pluralism and high levels of participation. To start, the government must guarantee all citizens equal political and civil rights as well as the means to fully exercise these rights (Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003, p. 19). Citizens should be free to organize into political groupings of their choice, such as a political party, whose power will naturally ascend and decline over time. Elections should always be competitive and the opposition should always have a realistic possibility of increasing its support or power. Political choices should not be dominated by powerful groups, and minorities should have the same political rights and electoral opportunities as others (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Schmitter & Karl, 1996, p. 56; Touraine, 1997).

3. Functioning of Government

This sub-category addresses how the government functions between elections. In an effective democracy, elected rulers are not simply figureheads: they wield real power and determine the actual policies of the nation's government. Rulers are not heavily influenced by the presence of criminal gangs, the military or foreign governments. In addition, corruption levels should be relatively low and the government should enact laws and programs to maintain this low level. Lastly, openness and transparency should be present at all levels of government between elections (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Schmitter & Karl, 1996, p. 55; Dahl, 1982, p. 11; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19).

4. Freedom of Expression and Belief

The freedom of expression and belief is a pivotal concept in a democracy. Huntington claims that this democratic institution is absolutely necessary for the

proper execution of the electoral process because it facilitates political campaigning and educated voters (Huntington, 1991, p. 7). A successful democracy should promote a free and independent media or other form of political expression. Censorship should remain relatively low and any retribution from the government should be minimal. Religious institutions should be allowed to exercise their faith, free from government intervention. Open and free discussion should be a staple of society and the educational system should avoid any political indoctrination (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Dahl, 1982, p. 11; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19).

5. Associational and Organizational Rights

This sub-category refers to the ability of groups to organize, meet, and operate without government intervention. In an effective democracy, the government will allow organizations to assemble and demonstrate peacefully, without threat of retribution towards them or their supporters. In addition, non-government organizations are not subjected to excessive bureaucratic requirements or unreasonable economic restraints. Lastly, citizens may bind together in the form of trade unions or peasant organizations or seek other means of collective bargaining (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Dahl, 1982, p. 11).

6. Rule of Law

Governments that excel in this sub-category possess an independent judiciary that is free of influence from other branches of government or outside sources. The rule of law should prevail in civil and criminal matters and other members of the government adhere to judicial rulings. Law enforcement should be under direct civilian control and police must adequately protect citizens while also acknowledging their individual rights. When these rights are violated, the government must provide a means of redress. Lastly, laws must be universally enforced on all segments of the population, to include rulers (*"Methodology,"* 2008; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19; Touraine, 1997).

7. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

This sub-category describes an individual's ability to own property and make individual choices autonomous of the government. In an effective democracy, few restrictions exist regarding foreign travel, residency, and employment. Individuals may pursue a life of their choosing to include selecting both their marriage partners as well as the size of their families. Citizens may own property and pursue private business interests without undue influence from political entities, security forces, or organized crime. Most importantly, all citizens possess an equality of opportunity and an absence of economic exploitation, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, or economic status (*Methodology*," 2008; Luckham et al., 2003, p. 19).

C. QUANTIFYING A DEMOCRACY

In order to quantify the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a democracy, each of these sub-categories must be assigned a numerical value that corresponds to its relative importance. According to Freedom House, each of these characteristics hold nearly equal importance and should therefore receive the same number of points (*Methodology*," 2008). In accordance with this argument, five points will be assigned to each criterion and the resulting quantitative criteria, depicted in Figure 1, will be used in Chapter IV to evaluate the effectiveness of a democratic regime.

Characteristic	Utility Values
Electoral Process	5
Political Pluralism and Participation	5
Functioning of Government	5
Freedom of Expression and Belief	5
Associational and Organizational Rights	5
Rule of Law	5
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights	5

Figure 1. Quantified Criteria for Evaluating a Successful Democracy

D. TWO AVENUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

In *The Third Wave*, Samuel Huntington defines democratization as “the end of the nondemocratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and then the consolidation of the democratic system” (1991, p. 9). In this discussion, it is assumed that the nondemocratic regime is no longer present and the target nation is beginning the inauguration process. The goal of the following avenues is to navigate this middle phase and set the stage for successful consolidation. The long and tedious process of democratic consolidation will fall outside the scope of this discussion.

When considering how to approach the democratization process, two avenues seem apparent. The first is to begin inauguration at the apex of the governmental structure, eventually working down through the regional and local levels of government. The other solution is to start inauguration at the local level, slowly building the government, culminating at the national level. At this point, it is important to note that these approaches characterize ideal progressions of democratization and may not be realistically attainable. Constraints of time and resources often blur and complicate the democratization process. However, this discussion will remain focused on the ideal in order to provide a consistent baseline from which to compare the two avenues. Both exhibit distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and both should be examined.

1. The First Step of Democratization

The first and most important step in any democratization process, regardless of the approach, is to provide a secure environment. Democracy cannot survive where anarchy thrives. Jack Snyder asserts that citizens expect states to provide them with security and promote their economic prosperity (Brown, 1993, p. 8). When the government is too weak to provide these services, the people will look elsewhere for support, effectively stripping the government of its power and legitimacy. Larry Diamond once stated, “If you don’t have a state, you can’t have a democratic state” (Lecture at Naval Postgraduate

School, Monterey, CA, Oct 30, 2007). This point further emphasizes that security must be the top priority when democratizing a nation; after a secure environment has been established, a fruitful democracy can begin to take root.

2. Building Democracy at the State Level

In *Man, the State, and War*, international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz claims that “man’s behavior...is, according to Rousseau, in great part a product of the society in which he lives. And society, he avers, is inseparable from political organization” (Waltz, 1954, p. 5). Continuing on, Waltz states, “Rousseau, like Plato, believes that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity, makes them good” (Waltz, 1954, p. 5). While his book is primarily about preventing interstate war, its lessons may be applied to other topics. According to these statements, man could be viewed as a product of his environment. Following this logic, another method for inaugurating a democratic state would be to establish an environment of democracy that will influence and develop its citizens. By working at the national level to promote a national identity and develop liberal institutions, transitioners can cultivate a civic form of nationalism, guarantee rights at the individual level, and create an environment ripe for democracy (Snyder, 2000, p. 40). Once this is accomplished, it should propagate down through the lower levels and instill itself within individuals; this is a top-down approach.

The first step in creating a nation’s civic identity is to build a strong middle class (Snyder, 2000, p. 321) to bridge the gap between elites and the working class. While this will require significant time and economic development, it plays a key role in defending civil rights and civic institutions. A strong middle class, acting as a bridge, also helps unify the populace and prevent civic identity from either fracturing or being hijacked by national elites. This is paramount before taking the next step of democratization.

Once a strong middle class arises, the next step is to develop a “thick version of liberalism” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317) through the development of free markets, free speech, individual rights and other democratic institutions. These institutions ensure “the rights and freedoms of all citizens are equally protected under the law,” (Luckham, Goetz, & Kaldor, 2003), p. 18). They promote mass participation, facilitate open and fair competition for power, ensure the accountability of the government, and fight tyranny of the majority (Luckham et al., 2003), pp. 15-16). In addition, developing liberalism can “ward off aggressively nationalist outcomes,” decrease intrastate violence, and limit the effectiveness of hostile elites (Snyder, 2000, p. 320). In short, this web acts as a safety net to ease the democratic transition and cultivate civic nationalism.

Other strands in the thick web include civic associations that prepare individuals for the next step in the democratic process. They unite men over minor, communal matters and enable them to develop the skills required to manage larger, political matters. They serve to “channel mass political participation into liberal directions” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317), provide a forum for rational discussion and the settlement of conflict, and promote citizen participation (Luckham et al., 2003). According to de Tocqueville, “civil associations, therefore, pave the way for political associations” and political associations pave the way for open elections (2003, p. 604).

Once civic and political associations have surpassed other forms of identity, it is time to organize elections. But elections should be approached cautiously because they simultaneously provide the greatest opportunity for success and the foremost chance for failure. If elections receive broad participation, citizens vote along civic lines, and losers accept the results, then the nation achieves a grand success and embarks on the path to becoming what Snyder and others call a mature or consolidated democracy (Snyder, 2000, p. 382).

However, if political and civic associations do not fully develop or if a nation's civic identity is weak, then elections may be doomed from the start. Ethnic associations or hostile elites could commandeer the democratic process, or influential leaders could encourage an election boycott; either would result in a non-representative government. Furthermore, ethnic groups could be mobilized as powerful voting blocks by those seeking election (Eller, 1999, p. 368; Snyder, 2000). If political parties form along ethnic lines, an election could degenerate to a mere census, introducing ethnic conflict into the nation's government and drawing attention away from civic issues. Once a non-representative government of any kind is entrenched in power, it is difficult to overcome (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Manning, 2007). It will be long and uphill battle to reacquire the nation's civic identity.

3. Building Democracy at the Individual Level

Waltz also claims that "the most important causes of political arrangements and acts are found in the nature and behavior of man" (Waltz, 1954, p. 42). However, man's nature is dynamic and his behavior is subject to influence. Waltz recognizes this and states that it is possible to institute change within a society by changing the attitudes of the individuals through education, religious-moral appeals, and other forms of behavioral science (Waltz, 1954). If Waltz is correct, then one approach for establishing a democracy is to instill democratic ideals within its individual citizens. Developing these ideals at the most basic level will enable the democratization of the individual, then the community, then the province, and finally the nation; it is a bottom-up approach.

The first step is to promote equality and trust at the individual level through the building of social capital: "a set of informal values or norms ... that permits [a group] to cooperate with one another" (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 98). Equality and trust are the cornerstones of a successful democracy and pivotal to the success of a society (de Tocqueville, Bevan, Kramnick, de Tocqueville, & de Tocqueville, 2003; Fukuyama, 2000, p. 98). Building social capital promotes the development

of democratic ideals by demonstrating the necessity for individuals to work together for the betterment of the community. During the democratization process, newly independent citizens regrettably may become “drunk with their new power” (de Tocqueville et al., 2003, p. 590). Social capital can serve as an antidote. It helps temper the spread of egoism, and upholds the protection of civil liberties. Most importantly, the democratization process is based on promoting conflict among factions and resolving this conflict through peaceful negotiation and compromise (Rustow, 1969). Social capital can serve as the currency to fund the path to compromise.

Next comes the formation of civic associations, organized around civic issues. These associations provide forums where citizens develop their abilities to communicate, negotiate, and navigate towards a common goal. Democratic ideals are reinforced and developed as individuals come together as organized citizens, not as fractured individuals. In 1841, de Tocqueville observed civic associations within the U.S. stating: “each citizen learned the skills of uniting with his fellows to defend his freedom at a time when he is becoming individually weaker and consequently less capable of preserving his freedom in isolation” (de Tocqueville et al., 2003, p. 595). Eventually, citizens will apply their newly refined skills to confront political issues, leading to the formation of political associations.

Political associations, founded upon political issues, supply the necessary framework for broad participation in government and the management of regular, open elections. These associations allow the nation to achieve the mass participation required for a democracy. Once a few elections have passed, democracy becomes “the only game in town” (Snyder, 2000, p. 27). Elections are viewed as the legitimate method to attain power and losers accept the results, choosing to wait for the next election to pursue power (Przeworski, 1991). At this point, the nation has passed enough tests to be considered a successful democratic state and is well on its way to successful consolidation (Snyder, 2000).

Because of its focus on the individual, this approach may provide the best chance of long-term success; but it does pose other challenges. Developing social capital is a long and laborious process. Social capital is “a nebulous concept that is difficult if not impossible to measure” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 101) and without applicable metrics, demonstrating progress or assessing an accurate timetable would be problematic. For this reason, this avenue is not ideal for situations where the democratization process must move rapidly or demonstrate measurable progress.

E. APPLICATION OF THE AVENUES

These two avenues, hereafter referred to as top-down and bottom-up, are two of the most common approaches to democratization and portray this discussion’s preferred approaches. However, they should not be viewed as universal solutions to the democratization problem. Rustow claims that “there may be many roads to democracy” (1969, p. 345) and these avenues merely represent two such roads; many others are possible.

Each of these avenues is uniquely different from its partner and each exhibits unique strengths and weaknesses. One is faster while the other is more thorough; one focuses on the people while the other focuses on the institutions. Depending on the scenario present in the target nation, one avenue may be more appropriate or more successful than the other. Also of note, the democratization process does not take place in a vacuum; there is significant interplay between transitioners, national elite, and citizens. Different avenues elicit different responses from each faction, which in turn affect the overall course and success of democratization.

Now that two main avenues for democratization have been identified, the discussion can move forward to other components. The next chapter will analyze the group personalities of national elite in an attempt to predict their responses to various democratization avenues. Chapter IV will then apply game

theory to analyze the interplay between transitioners and national elite and determine the likely outcome of each of the two avenues when confronted with two types of national elite.

III. MOTIVATIONS AND PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES

Dating back to the time of Plato, scholars have always believed that man plays a role in shaping history and that those placed in positions of leadership have an even greater part to play (Plato & Jowett, 1941). Exactly how great a role is variable. This chapter begins by discussing the role a nation's elite play in the democratization process and continues by examining the different desires that are commonly present within national elites. Next, it arranges these desires into personality profiles that describe different varieties of national elites. Upon completion, each profile will possess quantifiable strivings that can then be used to calculate the utility payouts received by elites under various circumstances. These payouts will enable a better understanding of the actions taken by national elites and will lead to more accurate predictions of elite behavior. The findings can consequently be applied to the partial conflict analysis conducted in Chapter IV.

A. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL ELITES

At this point, it is important to establish a definition for national elites. Higley, Burton and Gunther pose this statement:

We define elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principle decision makers in the largest or most resource rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society (Higley & Gunther, 1992, p. 8).

Eller provides a more thorough depiction, describing them as “an elite class availing [themselves] of the opportunities that education, economy, and politics presented” who then “take the reins of power” during a transition (Eller, 1999, p. 35). They control large caches of material resources, educational knowledge, and community influence and can mobilize a group to action. In

effect, they control “the circuitry and infrastructure of ethnicity and nationalism” and can “mount a successful movement, peaceful or violent, in the group’s cause” (Eller, 1999, p. 45).

The political behavior of national elites is affected by many variables, including: input from the current situation; the cultural, sociopolitical, and familial environment; and the personality of the individual (Post & George, 2004, p. 13). According to psychiatrist and political personality profiler Jerald Post, a leader’s personality has often been overlooked in the past. Instead, leaders were depicted as a “rational decision maker, devoid of personality, with little attention paid to effects, drives, and unresolved conflicts” (Post & George, 2004, p. 14). However, one study has shown that the effects of an individual’s personality are amplified when the environment is in transition, especially if the individual is in a position of influence (Greenstein, 1987). These two observations perfectly describe a nation’s elites as they participate in the democratization process. Therefore, it can be argued that the personality of elites play a significant factor in the democratization process.

Several agree that elites constitute one of the most critical variables in the democratization process; their support can mean the difference between a smooth transition to a successful democracy and a downward spiral towards a failed state (Diamond, 1999, p. 66; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1991). Specifically, Diamond states that elites are “indispensable to bringing about democracy and making it work” (Diamond, 1999, p. 218). If elites maintain an adaptable stance and are willing to negotiate the process, a peaceful transition is likely to follow. On the other hand, if national elites are unwilling to compromise and instead choose to mobilize the populace in opposition to democratization, intrastate violence or failed states are probable outcomes.

If transitioners can find a way to sway elites and harness their influence in support of the transition, it will enable them to maximize the probability of installing a stable, democratic government and minimize the probability of

intrastate violence and internal collapse. But how do outside actors sway national elites? In order to answer this question, a different question must first be posed: “What motivates national elites?”

B. BASIC MOTIVATIONS OF NATIONAL ELITES

Simply put, motivations constitute those basic desires and values that influence an individual and govern his or her behavior. They are what enable a person to assign utility to possible outcomes and the foundation for making a rational choices between conflicting alternatives (Reiss, 2000). Motivations may also be identified as desires or strivings; in this discussion these three terms will be used synonymously. An individual’s motivations will form the core of their decision-making and will ultimately dictate their behavior. To identify and quantify these strivings, it is beneficial to employ a tool from the realm of psychology called sensitivity theory.

Sensitivity theory states that “people behave as if they are trying to maximize their experiences of 15 intrinsically valued joys” (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003, p. 124). These 15 basic desires apply to all human beings as well as many of our closer animal relatives. They are not good or bad, better or worse, moral or wicked; they are simply neutral. Figure 2 shows Reiss’s 15 basic desires and gives a brief explanation of each (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003, p. 124; Reiss, 2000, pp. 17-18).

Motive	Description
Power	Desire to influence others (including leadership, dominance)
Curiosity	Desire for knowledge
Independence	Desire for self-reliance
Status	Desire for social standing (including desire for attention, wealth)
Social Contact	Desire for companionship (including desire to play, party)
Vengeance	Desire to get even (including desire to compete, to win)
Honor	Desire to be loyal to one's parents and heritage (obey a moral code)
Idealism	Desire to improve society (including desire for social justice)
Physical Exercise	Desire for exercise of muscles
Romance	Desire for sex and beauty (including courting)
Family	Desire to raise one's own children
Order	Desire for organization (including desire for ritual)
Eating	Desire to consume food
Acceptance	Desire for inclusion and approval
Tranquility	Desire to avoid anxiety, fear, and pain (desire for emotional calm)

Figure 2. Reiss's 15 Basic Desires

Each individual possesses a unique mix of these desires, which is the result of family genetics and life experiences (Reiss, 2000). This mix is called a desire profile, or Reiss profile, and represents a person's "unique prioritization of the 15 strivings" (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003). When there is a conflict between two motivations, the higher-priority desire takes precedence (Reiss, 2000). In a previous study, Havercamp and Reiss demonstrated that individuals serving in similar positions possess similar desire profiles (2003). Based on these conclusions, it should be possible to develop a set of generalized desire profiles that encompass different types of national elites. When applying these profiles, it is important to view them as "a set of premises and beliefs..., and not as a set of rules and recipes to be applied mechanically" (George, 1996, p. 375). If viewed with the proper perspective, these profiles can function as a means to predict general elite behavior.

The 15 basic desires are not equally valued by all elites with some carrying more importance than others. Studies have shown that those motivations that are unusually strong will have a greater impact on an individual's

behavior (Havercamp & Reiss, 2003). Those valued as “very important” will have a positive effect, as the individual steers towards these desires (Reiss, 2000). Therefore, focusing on only the stronger desires will both simplify the process as well as generalize the profile. This will frame a problem that is small enough to solve, as well as findings that are broad enough to serve a wide scope. The following sections represent a short discussion of the basic desires that have the most influence on the behavior of national elites.

1. Power

Power is the most significant and most frequent desire in a profile of national elites. Reiss claims that the craving for power is often satisfied in one of two ways: achievement or leadership. Achievements may be large or small; for example, they can range from earning entry into an esteemed profession to winning a local bowling league. These accomplishments place the individual in a position of influence, label them as the envy of their peers, and briefly satiate the individual’s appetite for power. On the other hand, leadership places an individual in a position of influence and provides them with the ability to affect others. Supplied with this new authority, their desire is temporarily satisfied (Reiss, 2000).

By definition, national elites often boast many achievements and actively seek leadership roles within their society. Eller states that they “take the reins of power” in a transition (Eller, 1999, p. 35) and possess the ability to “mount a successful movement, peaceful or violent, in the group’s cause” (Eller, 1999, p. 45). Elites actively seek opportunities to exert influence over the local populace and therefore it seems reasonable to assume that all national elites would rate power as “very important.”

2. Status

Most elites strive to acquire and maintain status. This desire can be characterized as longing for prestige, attempting to “move up” in the world, and

hoping to “become somebody” and impress one’s peers. A person with this desire would choose a Mercedes-Benz over a Crown Victoria simply because it implies a higher status. In addition, reputations are very important to someone who is motivated by status (Reiss, 2000, pp. 62-64).

National elites typically live comfortable lifestyles. They are members of a higher class and are considered local or regional celebrities. Most are cognizant of their public image. Their designation as a national elite, by definition, grants them a high status. If living in this manner did not please them, sensitivity theory hypothesizes that they would eventually retreat to a different lifestyle where they would be more comfortable, resigning their high status (Reiss, 2000). By choosing to maintain their position of authority, they reveal that status is something they want. As a result, it earns a rating of “very important.”

3. Acceptance

Acceptance is another quality that drives national elites. This striving is defined as “the desire for inclusion” and “motivates people to avoid rejection and criticism.” Those who rate acceptance as “very important” often consider themselves unworthy and are constantly seeking praise and adulation. They often surround themselves with those who will placate them and acquiesce with their opinions (Reiss, 2000, pp. 43-44).

National elites are often described as narcissistic and many, at least superficially, appear to exude self-confidence. While elites often give the impression of brilliance, closer examination often reveals that an elite resides “within a glass bubble” and “actually has feelings of inferiority and thus is over-dependent on the approving attention of other people” (Volkan, 1980, p. 132). Post describes these individuals as “mirror-hungry leaders” who “require a continuing flow of admiration from their audiences to nourish their famished selves” (2004, p. 191). These “mirror-hungry leaders” would consider acceptance to be “very important.”

4. Honor

Honor is another striving that must be considered for the elite profiles. This motivation is defined as “the desire to be loyal to one’s parents and, by extension, to one’s [background].” Reiss further states that “people with a strong desire for honor tend to place a high value on character, religion, ethnic traditions, and patriotism.” They are often motivated by “a strong sense of duty that takes precedence over everything else” (Reiss, 2000, pp. 52-53). While honor is not universal to all national elites, it does apply to sizeable factions such as tribal leaders, religious elders, and nationalistic figures. For elites that exhibit a strong duty towards their country, their ethnic origin, or their religious background, honor is “very important” and must be included in their profile.

5. Idealism

The pursuit of idealism also shapes the behavior of many national elites. This desire “motivates people to get involved and contribute to the betterment of human kind” (Reiss, 2000, p. 55). Elites that desire idealism will place a high value on fairness, social justice and are more likely to support democratization. By definition, all national elites are heavily involved in their society, but not all elites exercise their influence to make the world a better place. Those who toil for social or humanitarian causes and contribute to those in need would rate idealism as “very important.”

6. Omitted Desires

In developing this set of desire profiles, the majority of the motivations did not strongly influence elites. This is not unusual as Reiss claims that most people are heavily influenced by 3-10 desires and national elites follow this pattern. After reviewing Eller’s description of national elites and Post’s collection of psychological profiles, the remaining ten desires were eliminated (curiosity, independence, social contact, vengeance, physical exercise, romance, family, order, eating, and tranquility) because they do not appear to significantly impact

elites. For example, while most elites actively pursue and thrive in social environments, the motivation of social contact does not drive them because these situations usually serve as means to an end. Elites often seek out social gatherings because it increases their constituency (satisfying the desire for power), furthers a social movement they support (desire for idealism), or fuels their celebrity status (desire for status or acceptance). Rarely do national elites congregate with common people because they view it as “fun.”

C. DESIRE PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES

Elites can be divided into two general categories: self-oriented and service-oriented. Loosely based on two accepted leader personality types, one group acts in a manner that will benefit themselves while the other group strives to benefit others (Post & George, 2004, p. 106). These two groups comprise the most common personalities found among leaders and provide an excellent foundation for studying national elites and their impact on the democratization process.

1. Self-oriented National Elites

The conscience of self-oriented national elite are dominated by self-interest. They are driven by ambition and are often preoccupied with visions of unlimited success, power, and brilliance. These elites emanate a grandiose aura of self-importance and place a high priority on maintaining and enhancing their career and their public image. From an outsider’s view, they often appear to be principled and scrupulous, using this deception to their advantage (Post & George, 2004). Self-oriented elites commonly manipulate and exploit others to accomplish their own ends. Ironically, despite a façade of grandeur, these elites often possess fragile self-esteem and lack empathy. Craving adulation, they often surround themselves with sycophants, placing themselves out of touch with reality (Post & George, 2004; American Psychiatric Association & American Psychiatric Association. Task Force on DSM-IV, 1994, pp. 658-670).

After observing the lives of self-oriented elites, it is apparent which strivings dominate their desire profiles. The behavior of these elites is focused around the pursuit of three desires: power, acceptance, and status. When combined, these basic motivations form the profile of an individual whose behavior focuses on self-interest and who displays narcissistic tendencies. The following description, provided by Jerrold Post, demonstrates how elite behavior can show evidence of multiple desires. In this case, the unique blend of desires exhibited by Kim Jong Il categorizes him as a self-oriented elite.

Kim Jong Il, the chair of the North Korean National Defense Commission, has built his life around power, acceptance, and status. He is the alleged source of multiple betrayals and even a few deaths (Post & George, 2004, pp. 244-246). His thirst for power trumps all as he will “use whatever aggression is necessary, without qualm or conscience, be it to eliminate an individual or to strike out at a particular group” (Post & George, 2004, p. 255). Agitated by his short stature and desiring the acceptance of others, Kim reportedly wears custom-built platform shoes and employs a flamboyant hairstyle to help boost his height (Post & George, 2004, p. 247). His inner circle is filled with sycophants and he often employs fear and humiliation to exert control over them and maintain their loyalty. Motivated by status, he spends between \$650,000 and \$800,000 each year on French cognac, 770 times the average income of a North Korean worker. His seven-story pleasure palace in Pyongyang is supplied with only the finest luxuries and is the site of lavish nightly parties (Post & George, 2004, p. 249). Meanwhile, when famines strike the country, he often denies food and aid to those in need and herds thousands into camps where the death toll skyrockets (Post & George, 2004, p. 249).

2. Service-oriented National Elites

Service-oriented national elites are governed by a strong sense of duty and morality. Their primary focus is to do the right thing and they rely primarily on their principles for guidance. The source of these principles may vary from

person to person; some will be heavily devoted to their nation, others will be loyal to their ethnicity, and still others will abide by their instilled morals. Many of these individuals pursue positions as a national elite because it enables them to serve something greater than themselves. Unlike self-oriented elites, they do not require adulation and often choose the unpopular road because they feel it is the right course. However, the pursuit of power and influence remain important because these are the tools of their trade and allow them to enact change upon their society.

Like self-oriented elites, service-oriented elites are also described by desire profile. Based on their observed behavior, these elites place a strong emphasis on the basic motivations of honor, idealism, and power. Collectively, these desires portray an individual who places the common good above their own ambitions. They view their position more as a responsibility and less as a privilege. As an elite, they have been given the opportunity to make their world a better place and they strive to uphold that responsibility.

Charles de Gaulle, the leader of France from 1958-1968, exhibits these characteristics. As a boy, he was so engulfed by nationalism (desire for honor), and he refused to learn English. Often accused of being aloof, he usually stood alone, choosing not to interact with others. De Gaulle viewed them merely as ordinary human beings whereas he bore the responsibilities of France. As an elite, he was responsible to the French citizens and it was his duty to guide their nation to greatness. In 1958, he agreed to assume the role of dictator to resolve a revolt and restore peace to the country. Although he was pleased with this position of power, it did not consume him. Ten years later, he chose to sacrifice his position as dictator to appease another revolt. Although it cost him both power and the popularity of his nation, he stepped aside for the betterment of his country (Post & George, 2004, pp. 46-49).

D. QUANTIFYING THE DESIRE PROFILES OF NATIONAL ELITES

According to sensitivity theory, a person's behavior is the direct result of attempts to maximize those desires that are valued by that individual. The more value a person places on a desire, the greater the impact on that person's behavior. The previous section divided national elites into two sub-categories: self-oriented and servant-oriented. A desire profile was developed for each by highlighting the top three motivations of each group. Now the final step is to assign cardinal utility values to each desire in order to discern the payouts for various decisions.

To begin, each profile is assigned a pool of 30 utility points to be divided among the three desires, according to their relative importance. Beginning with the first profile, self-oriented national elites strongly exhibit the desire for power as many of Post's profiles illustrate (Post & George, 2004). Because of its high value to self-oriented elites, power will receive half, or fifteen, of the utility points from the pool. The desire for acceptance is strong enough to affect elite behavior most of the time and, as a result, will be assigned ten points. The desire for status is another driving force and it will receive the remaining five points. This payout system follows elite valuations of these three desires and is visible in the figure below.

Strong Desires	Utility Values
Power	15
Acceptance	10
Status	5

Figure 3. Quantified Desire Profile of Self-oriented National Elites

With servant-oriented national elites, the desires for honor and idealism are displayed most often. The dominant desire depended on the values and principles of the individual elite. To symbolize their nearly equal importance to servant-oriented national elites, these two desires are each assigned twelve

points. The remaining six points are assigned to the desire for power, which is viewed by these elites primarily as a means to achieve other goals. It is still a significant desire, but not as important as the other two. The figure below shows the desire profile for service-oriented national elites as well as the utility values assigned to each desire.

Strong Desires	Utility Values
Honor	12
Idealism	12
Power	6

Figure 4. Quantified Desire Profile of Servant-oriented National Elites

Armed with quantifiable desire profiles, the next chapter will apply these profiles to elites confronted by the democratization process. Representative of the values of national elites, the desire models will be used to predict the subsequent reactions of national elites as they are propelled into a transition to democracy.

IV. A PARTIAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

The democratization process can be modeled as a game played between two players. On one side of the board are the transitioners, who are attempting to inaugurate democracy in the target nation. On the other side are the national elites, who wield power and influence within the target nation. Each side enters the game with unique objectives, which signify the results they hope to achieve at the end of this game. Both sides have moves available to them, which represent the different courses of action they may take to affect the outcome of democratization. As in all games, there is inherent conflict between these two players. In this instance, it is a game of partial conflict, as a gain or loss by one player does not guarantee the reverse for the other player; it is not a zero-sum game. In some instances, both sides win, and in others, both sides lose.

Analyzing the player relationships within this game will provide insight into the democratization process and help to identify causal relationships, likely outcomes, and optimal solutions. This chapter will conduct that analysis. First, it will identify the players and their primary objectives. Next, it will apply the findings from Chapter II and Chapter III to develop an interval utility scale that measures the satisfaction gained by each player throughout the game. Then, it will develop a payout matrix by pitting different courses of action against each other, and determining how each player's objectives are satisfied by the various outcomes. Lastly, it will analyze the payout matrix to determine each side's optimal strategy, analyze the prospects of strategic moves or side payments, and ascertain the probable outcome of the democratization process. To finish, it will then apply these same methodologies to a multi-party environment where multiple varieties of national elite are present. While this particular analysis is based on a simplified model of the democratization process, the analysis

framework is open to further expansion; with proper research, utility values may be tailored to provide a more in-depth and accurate analysis of a specific situation.

A. THE PLAYERS

As in any game, there are multiple players. In the democratization process, two are primary: the transitioners and the national elites. In this discussion, all players are assumed to be rational, meaning that they make choices according to what provides the greatest utility and hence the most satisfaction for that individual player. The following sections examine the objectives and choices available for each of the players.

1. Transitioners

Transitioners represent the group attempting to inaugurate democracy in the target nation. In recent cases, transitioners have not been native to the target nation; examples include U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq, NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan and Bosnia, and UN initiatives in Namibia in 1989, Cambodia in 1993, and East Timor in 1999. In general, a blend of idealistic and realistic values, which are codified in the following two objectives, motivate transitioners.

- 1) (35 pts) Install a successful, liberal democracy as outlined in Chapter II.
- 2) (15 pts) Maintain low levels of violence in the transitioning nation

Since democratization is the overall goal, transitioners' primary objective is to install a successful, liberal democracy. The more effective the installed government, the more satisfaction transitioners receive. Therefore, the criteria developed in Chapter II that measures the effectiveness of a democratic regime can also be applied to measure the satisfaction of transitioners.

Maintaining low levels of violence is the second objective of transitioners because security is a prerequisite for any successful democracy (Lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Oct 30, 2007). Not only does violence decrease the chances of a successful democratic transition, it also increases the cost, in both materials and human capital, of the transition and lengthens the time required. Violence also degrades stability and damages the transitioner's credibility in the nation and in the world. All of these items decrease the satisfaction gained by transitioners. The absence of violence lowers costs, hastens benefits, and boosts the reputations of all involved. However, while security is highly influential in the outcome, it does not represent the primary objective of transitioners and therefore is only assigned 15 utility points.

As discussed in Chapter II, transitioners have two main avenues when democratizing a nation. They can instill democracy within the individual, building upwards to the national level, or they can install democracy in the nation, permeating down to the individual. Either avenue represents a viable course of action and the decision as to which path to take represents a "move."

2. National Elites

In Chapter III, national elites are defined as those that maintain power and influence within a nation, especially as it transitions to a democratic regime (Eller, 1999; Higley & Gunther, 1992). Elites' decision rationales are often dominated by their personal desire profiles, which were examined at length in Chapter III (Post & George, 2004; Reiss, 2000). This chapter also determined that national elites could be divided into two categories: self-oriented and servant-oriented. These two categories have different desire profiles and naturally possess different objectives.

Self-oriented elites draw satisfaction by achieving the following objectives:

- 1) (15 pts) Maintain or increase personal power
- 2) (10 pts) Maintain or increase acceptance by the populace
- 3) (5 pts) Maintain or increase personal status

Self-oriented elites are dominated by self-interest. As described in Chapter III, they exhibit the desire for power and continually strive to maintain or increase their power. In addition, they place a high priority on acceptance and gain satisfaction when they are loved and adored by the populace. Lastly, self-oriented elites also strive to advance their personal status. The point values assigned to each objective are drawn directly from the desire profiles developed in Chapter III.

Servant-oriented elites draw satisfaction from attaining these objectives:

- 1) (12 pts) Maintain and promote honorable behavior
- 2) (12 pts) Maintain and promote idealistic beliefs
- 3) (6 pts) Maintain or increase personal power

Servant-oriented national elites are guided by a sense of duty and morality. As illustrated in Chapter III, these elites exhibit honorable tendencies and continually strive to fulfill their duties and obligations. In addition, they place a high value on ideals such as fairness and social justice. Servant-oriented elites, like self-oriented elites, are also interested in expanding their power, although it is viewed as relatively less important. As with self-oriented elites, these point values are drawn directly from the desire profiles in the previous chapter.

All national elites, regardless of which desire profile they follow, have two possible reactions to the democratization process. They can either accept democratization, and harness their influence to ease the transition, or they can reject democracy, and mobilize the populace against it. The decision as to whether to accept or mobilize represents a “move.”

B. THE PAYOUTS

When various courses of action are matched against one another, it results in four scenarios with four possible outcomes. To properly determine the results, these outcomes first must be studied. Once that is accomplished, focus may be shifted to the payouts received, as different outcomes will provide different levels of satisfaction for each party. Using the aforementioned objectives to examine each outcome will create a set of payouts that signify the general satisfaction gained by each player in each outcome.

1. The Four Scenarios and Their Outcomes

In the first possible scenario, transitioners install democracy using a top-down approach while national elites accept democracy and use their power and influence to ease the transition. Transitioners attempt to build the middle class through economic development, enabling elites to benefit materially from the economic growth. Free markets, free speech, and individual rights are instituted, and the presence of social justice increases dramatically. The support and backing of elites further improves the effectiveness of these institutions. This not only creates an open competition for power and decreases the propensity for violence, but also breaks the power monopoly once held by national elites. Because of these developments, transitioners are able to cultivate a civic form of nationalism, built on civic associations. These associations unite citizens over civic matters and train them in political matters. Elections soon follow, likely resulting in a representative government where elites have a fair chance to attain power (Snyder, 2000).

In the second possible scenario, transitioners again take a top-down approach, but national elites reject democracy. Instead, they prefer to exercise their power and influence in mobilizing the populace against the transition. As in the previous scenario, transitioners begin by promoting economic development to develop the middle class, while elites look for ways to profit. Transitioners

continue democratization by instituting free markets, free speech, and individual rights. Elites continue mobilizing, but the presence of democratic institutions and the resulting open competition for power limits their effectiveness. Transitioners' attempts to cultivate a civic form of nationalism are tempered by elite actions but do result in a partial success. When elections are held, elites likely commandeer the process and cause it to fail. Election results probably fall along non-civic lines (ethnic, religious, etc.), resulting in a non-representative government that is very difficult to mend (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Snyder, 2000).

In the third scenario, transitioners switch to a bottom-up approach, and the national elites support the transition. Transitioners build social capital at the local level by promoting equality and trust; this eventually leads to the formation of civic and political associations. During this formative process, elites relinquish some power, influence, and status, but are rewarded by an increase in social justice and acceptance. Transitioners slowly begin organizing elections, starting at the local levels, methodically moving up the government hierarchy, and culminating at the national level. Because of the support received from elites and the presence of civil liberties, these elections likely result in large numbers of informed voters selecting a representative government (de Tocqueville et al., 2003; Fukuyama, 2000).

In the last scenario, transitioners once again adopt a bottom-up approach, but the national elites fight against the transition. Transitioners' attempts to build social capital are slowed by the intervention of hostile elites, and it takes even longer to create effective civic and political associations. In the process, elites do lose some of their power and status but hijack these associations to regain what was lost. When elections are finally organized, the lack of proper associations decreases their chance for success. The result is a non-representative government, dominated by elites (de Tocqueville et al., 2003; Fukuyama, 2000).

2. Transitioners Payouts for the Four Scenarios

Using each party's objectives to evaluate the outcomes described above yields the following sets of payouts, shown in Figures 5 – 7. Partial credit was awarded whenever an objective was partially satisfied. Each party's table reflects very different levels of satisfaction. To start, Figure 5 shows the utility payouts received by transitioners in each of the four scenarios.

Transitioners		Top-down vs Accept Democracy	Top-down vs Mobilize Populace	Bottom-up vs Accept Democracy	Bottom-up vs Mobilize Populace
	Pts Possible	Points Awarded			
Security	15	15	10	12	7
Electoral Process	5	5	4	4	3
Political Pluralism and Participation	5	4	2	5	3
Functioning of Government	5	4	2	5	3
Freedom of Expression	5	4	4	3	3
Associational and Organizational Rights	5	3	3	4	4
Rule of Law	5	4	2	5	3
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights	5	4	3	3	2
Total	50	43	30	41	28

Figure 5. Transitioners Payouts

In the first scenario (column one), the two sides collaborate to establish democracy using a top-down approach. Because both parties are cooperating, there is very little violence (15 pts) and the transition moves relatively quickly. The Electoral Process is executed quickly and independently (5 pts) with a fairly large turnout from both citizens and competing parties, and results in good Political Pluralism and Participation (4 pts). In addition, the cooperation between transitioners and national elites produces a well functioning government (4 pts). Since the top-down approach focuses on the formation of democratic institutions, it produces good results in the categories of Freedom of Expression (4 pts), Rule of Law (4 pts), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4 pts). However,

because this approach does not focus as heavily on the formation of associations, Associational and Organizational Rights are not as prevalent (3 pts). In total, this scenario yields a payout of 43 utility points for transitioners.

In the second scenario (column two), transitioners apply a top-down strategy but elites do not cooperate, instead choosing to mobilize the populace against the transition. This results in moderate levels of violence (10 pts) as transitioners and national elites both struggle for power. The Electoral Process continues as planned but elites may resort to intimidation to undermine elections (4 pts). Political Pluralism and Participation suffer greatly as elites commandeer elections or organize boycotts (2 pts). The struggle between transitioners and national elites manifests further as the government has difficulty functioning efficiently (2 pts) and the Rule of Law is displaced by individualism (2 pts). This avenue's focus on democratic institutions manages to protect Freedom of Expression (4 pts), but Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights suffer in the struggle (3 pts). Associational and Organizational Rights remain average (3 pts). This scenario supplies transitioners with a total payout of 30 utility points.

In the third scenario (column three), both sides cooperate to establish democracy using a bottom-up approach. Nevertheless, even with elite support, this avenue still requires a long time to develop, and results in the presence of some violence as the process drags on (12 pts). Because of the extended delay preceding elections, the Electoral Process is not as effective as it could be (4 pts). However, the bottom-up approach's emphasis on developing civic and political associations yields excellent results in the Political Pluralism and Participation (5 pts), Functioning of Government (5 pts), and Associational and Organizational Rights (4 pts) categories. Unfortunately, the focus on the citizen decreases emphasis on the institutions and leads to less Freedom of Expression (3 pts) and Personal Autonomy and Individual rights (3 pts). Finally, the cooperation between transitioners and national elites and the manufacturing of social capital enables the Rule of Law to reign supreme (5 pts). This scenario yields a total payout of 41 utility points for transitioners.

In the last scenario (column four), transitioners use a bottom-up approach but elites do not support it. The result is a prolonged struggle between transitioners and national elites with high levels of violence (7 pts). The combination of delayed elections and hostile elite involvement harm the Electoral Process (3 pts) while Political Pluralism and Participation suffers from elites undermining elections and hijacking the political process (3 pts). The ongoing conflict between transitioners and national elites degrades the government's ability to function effectively (3 pts) and significantly hinders the Rule of Law (3 pts). The focus on building social capital and developing associations finally pays dividends as Associational and Organizational Rights remain relatively high (4 pts). Unfortunately, a lack of emphasis on democratic institutions hurts Freedom of Expression (3 pts) and the prolonged conflict further imposes on Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (2 pts). All factors considered, this scenario generates a payout of 28 utility points for transitioners.

3. Self-oriented Elite Payouts for the Four Scenarios

When the four possible scenarios are viewed through the eyes of self-oriented national elites, each outcome offers a very different level of satisfaction. Figure 6 depicts the level of satisfaction gained by self-oriented elites in each scenario, based on their collective objectives. Once again, partial credit was awarded when an objective was partially met.

Self-oriented Elites	Pts Possible	Top-down vs Accept Democracy	Top-down vs Mobilize Populace	Bottom-up vs Accept Democracy	Bottom-up vs Mobilize Populace
		Points Awarded			
Power	15	10	12	7	15
Acceptance	10	3	6	5	8
Status	5	3	5	2	4
Total	30	16	23	14	27

Figure 6. Self-oriented National Elite Payouts

In the first scenario (column one), elites accept the top-down approach applied by transitioners and both parties cooperate to ease the transition. Elite power decreases as competitions for power become more open; but elites still

wield considerable influence through the political process (10 pts). Elite status suffers as national elites are made more equal with average citizens (3 pts). Finally, elite acceptance also drops to a new low (3 pts), as the populace shifts their love and adoration from individuals to organizations and institutions.

In the second scenario (column two), elites rebel against the top-down approach taken by transitioners, resulting in power struggles at the national level. This scenario provides excellent opportunities for elites to maintain and increase their power base, as they use the conflict to bring themselves to the forefront of the national stage. However, the presence of democratic institutions does help to temper their ambitions (12 pts). Elite acceptance grows as they are portrayed as the champions of the people (6 pts). Lastly, elite status is maximized as they develop crowds of supporters and move to the center of this high-profile conflict (5 pts).

In the third scenario (column three), national elites support the bottom-up approach proposed by transitioners. In this instance, elites are relegated to the level of an average citizen, greatly decreasing their power (7 pts) and status (2 pts) with no outlets available to recoup their losses. Fortunately, the development of social capital helps elites gain some acceptance from those around them (5 pts).

In the last scenario (column four), national elites mobilize the populace to counter transitioners' bottom-up approach, an approach that is not designed to handle this level of conflict. As a result, elites are able to derail the democratic transition, and manipulate it for their own purposes. This provides opportunities for elites to increase their power (15 pts) and places them in positions where they can be adored and accepted by the common citizen (8 pts). While elite status is still considered to be high (4 pts), this approach does not provide the political structures necessary to maximize this score.

4. Servant-oriented Elite Payouts

When the various outcomes are viewed from the perspectives of servant-oriented national elites, the results are quite different. Figure 7 depicts the level of satisfaction gained by servant-oriented elites in each scenario, based on their unique objectives. As before, partial credit was awarded whenever an objective was partially satisfied.

Servant-oriented Elites	Pts Possible	Top-down vs Accept Democracy	Top-down vs Mobilize Populace	Bottom-up vs Accept Democracy	Bottom-up vs Mobilize Populace
		Points Awarded			
Honor	12	12	6	10	4
Idealism	12	12	4	12	4
Power	5	4	5	3	6
Total	29	28	15	25	14

Figure 7. Servant-oriented National Elite Payouts

In the first scenario (column one), elites work with transitioners to apply a top-down approach to democratization. Because of the cooperation between both parties, and the emphasis on democratic institutions, this situation leads to the most honorable (12 pts) and most idealistic (12 pts) outcome. If elites choose to adopt the political process, they also have a good chance to maintain or increase their power at the national level (4 pts).

In the second scenario (column two), elites do not accept democracy and rebel against the top-down approach. This scenario leads to moderate levels of violence and a national struggle, with elites possessing a good chance of increasing their power (5 pts). Unfortunately, this will usually result in a non-representative government; one that is not viewed as dutiful and does not provide social justice. As a result, Honor (6 pts) and Idealism (4 pts) are both low.

In the third scenario (column three), national elites accept democracy and help transitioners take a bottom-up approach. This combined focus on liberty and equality brings high levels of satisfaction to those who seek social justice (12 pts). Furthermore, installing a representative government, the likely result of this

scenario, is a dutiful action, which also satisfies those who desire honor (10 pts). Regrettably, this scenario does force elites to surrender some power as a requirement of the democratic transition (3 pts).

In the last scenario (column four), national elites fight against democratization and mobilize the populace against the bottom-up approach proposed by transitioners. Because of the lack of institutions to curb hostile elites, the resulting power struggle provides national elites with the best opportunity to gain power (6 pts). However, this scenario likely results in a non-representative government or a failed state, with the average citizen bearing the majority of the cost. This is not viewed as honorable (4 pts) or idealistic (4 pts).

C. THE MATRIX²

To continue studying the democratization process, the players, courses of action, outcomes, and utility payouts described above need to be organized into two payoff matrices: Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites, and Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites.

1. Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites

The payout matrix depicted in Figure 8 illustrates the partial conflict between transitioners and self-oriented national elites.

² Analyzed using concepts from Straffin's *Game Theory and Strategy*, and Dixit & Nalebuff's *Thinking Strategically*.

		Self-oriented National Elites	
		Accept Democracy	Mobilize Populace
Transitioners	Top-Down	(43, 16) →	(30, 23)
	Bottom-Up	(41, 14) →	(28, 27)

Figure 8. Transitioners vs. Self-oriented National Elites Payout Matrix

When considering these utility values, transitioners have a dominant strategy to select a top-down approach and the elites have a dominant strategy to always mobilize. This creates a Nash Equilibrium and likely outcome in the top right quadrant with a payout of (30, 23). This probably results in a fractured national identity with a non-representative government, a fair amount of violence and instability, and an overall failed attempt at democratization.

To improve on this likely outcome, the matrix should be analyzed for any strategic moves. Because transitioners start the game by initiating the democratization process, national elites are in the enviable position of moving second. Despite this strategic advantage, the situation still results in a likely outcome of (30, 23). In addition, neither party possesses a viable threat or promise.

On the other hand, both parties could utilize side payments to alter the payout matrix to their benefit. Self-oriented elites, desiring outcome (28, 27), could provide additional incentives to convince transitioners to select a bottom-up approach. To be effective, these incentives must provide enough utility to make “Bottom-up” (payout of 28 + incentives) more desirous than “Top-down” (payout of 30). These incentives could be in the form of security guarantees, proposals

that promote a successful democratic transition or anything else that affects the transitioners' utility scale. Unfortunately, many of these incentives directly conflict with the objectives of self-oriented national elites and are not likely to be offered.

Transitioners, in an attempt to convince elites to accept democracy and secure a payout of at least 41 for themselves, could also offer incentives. Examples include powerful positions in the new government, or special titles and other status symbols. To be effective, these incentives must be worth at least seven utility points; they must make the choice "Accept Democracy" (payout of 16 + incentive) seem more appealing than "Mobilize" (payout of 23).

2. Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites

The payout matrix shown in Figure 9 depicts the partial conflict between transitioners and servant-oriented national elite.

		Servant-oriented National Elites	
		Accept Democracy	Mobilize Populace
Transitioners	Top-Down	(43, 28)	(30, 15)
	Bottom-Up	(41, 25)	(28, 14)

Figure 9. Transitioners vs. Servant-oriented National Elites Payout Matrix

Given these utility payouts, transitioners possess a dominant strategy and should always apply a Top-down approach. National elites also have a dominant strategy and should always accept democracy. This combination results in a Nash Equilibrium in the top left quadrant with a likely payout of (43, 28). This outcome is characterized by a stable, peaceful nation, a strong form of civic

nationalism, open and competitive elections, and a representative government divided along civic lines. Based on these utilities, this is the best possible outcome for both parties. As long as both players behave rationally and attempt to maximize their utility values, democratization results in a win-win situation.

Because the likely outcome is also the best possible outcome for each player, it is impossible to improve on the situation using strategic moves. In addition, no viable threats or promises are present. As in the previous game, transitioners initiate the democratization process, giving national elites the strategic advantage of moving second. Nevertheless, despite national elites' superior position, the likely outcome remains unchanged at (43, 28).

As before, either player could alter the matrix through the employment of incentives and side payments. Then again, because each player has already attained their most desirable outcome, such modifications to the matrix are not likely. Both parties should be content with the status quo and should not risk jeopardizing their winnings.

D. DEMOCRATIZING IN A MULTI-PARTY ENVIRONMENT

Unfortunately, the democratization process is far more complicated than this simple game suggests, mainly because it involves more than two stakeholders and often incorporates multiple varieties of national elites. Therefore, an examination of an environment where both self-oriented and servant-oriented national elites are present would be helpful. In order to account for the simultaneous presence of both of these parties, a few assumptions must first be made. First, the utility scales for all types of elites must be viewed as equitable. An increase of one utility point must represent the same increase in satisfaction for both self-oriented and servant-oriented elites. Second, the composition of elites must be viewed as a single, rational entity. Factions may debate over their move but eventually they must come to a unified decision as to which move to make and all elites must follow.

After applying these assumptions, the concept of expected value may be used to adapt the payout matrix to account for a multi-party environment. Figure 10 signifies an environment where X represents the percentage of self-oriented national elites present in the target nation and Y represents the percentage of servant-oriented national elites present in the target nation. The values of X and Y sum to equal one. As shown in the figure, the utility payouts for transitioners remain unchanged.

		Mixed National Elites	
		Accept Democracy	Mobilize Populace
Transitioners	Top-Down	(43, $16X + 28Y$)	(30, $23X + 15Y$)
	Bottom-Up	(41, $14X + 25Y$)	(28, $27X + 14Y$)

X = Percentage of Self-Oriented National Elites
 Y = Percentage of Servant-Oriented National Elites

Figure 10. Transitioners vs. Mixed National Elites Payout Matrix

Despite an environment of mixed national elites, transitioners still possess a dominant strategy and should always select a top-down approach. However, the dominate strategy for elites is variable. When X is comparatively big, the dominant strategy is for elites to mobilize, and when Y is comparatively big, the dominant strategy is to accept. This is congruent with the findings from the previous section, as self-oriented elites (X) prefer to Mobilize and servant-oriented elites (Y) prefer to Accept.

Figure 11 shows the utility payouts for mixed elites at various ratios.

Self (X)	Servant (Y)		TD vs. A	TD vs M	BU vs A	BU vs M
0	1		28.00	15.00	25.00	14.00
0.1	0.9		26.80	15.80	23.90	15.30
0.2	0.8		25.60	16.60	22.80	16.60
0.3	0.7		24.40	17.40	21.70	17.90
0.4	0.6		23.20	18.20	20.60	19.20
0.4583	0.5417	+	22.50	18.67	19.96	19.96
0.5	0.5		22.00	19.00	19.50	20.50
0.6	0.4		20.80	19.80	18.40	21.80
0.65	0.35	*	20.20	20.20	17.85	22.45
0.7	0.3		19.60	20.60	17.30	23.10
0.8	0.2		18.40	21.40	16.20	24.40
0.9	0.1		17.20	22.20	15.10	25.70
1	0		16.00	23.00	14.00	27.00

Figure 11. Mixed National Elite Utility Payouts

Depicted in this table are the two critical points where the dominant strategy for elites switches (* and +). When transitioners employ a top-down approach, their dominant and most likely strategy, the critical point occurs when self-oriented elites comprise 65% and servant-oriented elites comprise 35% of the total elite population (*). At this point, elites as a whole are indifferent as to which strategy to choose. However, if less than 35% of the elites present are servant-oriented, then the Mobilization strategy is dominant. Conversely, if more than 35% are servant-oriented, then the Accept strategy is dominant.

If transitioners adopt a bottom-up approach (not likely but still possible) then the critical proportion of servant-oriented elites increases to 54.17% (+). At that percentage, national elites are again indifferent as to which course of action to take. If less than 54.17% of the elites present are servant-oriented, then mobilizing becomes dominant. On the other hand, if more than 54.17% are servant-oriented, then accepting becomes dominant. This further shows that

transitioners are more likely to achieve success with a top-down approach because it requires a smaller proportion of servant-oriented elites to be successful.

E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

The results from Chapter II and Chapter III set the table and made it possible to describe the democratization process as a game of partial conflict between transitioners and two types of national elites: self-oriented and servant-oriented. Transitioners are primarily driven by the desire to install a successful democracy and have two approaches at their disposal: top-down and bottom-up. Self-oriented national elites are primarily motivated by power, acceptance, and status, and they have two courses of action available: accept democracy and mobilize the populace. Servant-oriented national elites are faced with the same choice but they are motivated primarily by honor, idealism, and power.

Different scenarios yield different outcomes and different levels of satisfaction for each player. Overall, it was discovered that transitioners have a dominant strategy of selecting a top-down approach to democratization. Self-oriented national elites have a dominant strategy to mobilize against the transition, while servant-oriented national elites have a dominant strategy to accept democracy. Yet, with sufficient incentives and side payments, it is theoretically possible to persuade any player to deviate from their dominant strategy.

When the game is played between transitioners and a blend of national elites, critical thresholds are identified. When the percentage of self-oriented elites exceeds the critical threshold, elites choose to mobilize. When the percentage falls below the critical threshold, elites choose to accept. The exact location of this threshold varies depending on which approach is taken by transitioners.

V. FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS

Modeling the democratization process as a game of partial conflict facilitates an in-depth look at the objectives of transitioners and national elites, the relationships between the various actors, and the likely outcomes in each scenario. It is now appropriate to see if any general findings may be extrapolated from this simple model. When applied properly, these insights could lead to more efficient methods when installing democratic regimes and promoting global democratization. While these findings do not present a comprehensive, optimized approach to the democratization process, they do provide insights that benefit both transitioners and national elites. The following sections provide a brief glimpse into each insight.

A. THE PREFERRED AVENUE TO DEMOCRATIZATION

As outlined in Chapter IV, transitioners should always select a top-down approach to democratization. This approach begins with a conscious effort to build the middle class through economic development. Then, it creates a “thick web of liberalism” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 316-317) protecting individual rights, promoting participation and competition, and ensuring government accountability. These institutions allow individuals to develop as citizens, leading to the organization of civic and political associations, and eventually culminating in nation-wide elections.

The top-down approach is favored and should be employed by transitioners for primarily two reasons. First, this approach typically provides a greater opportunity for installing a successful democratic regime. It yields more consistent results and boasts a stronger foundation because it is grounded in unwavering democratic institutions (free markets, free speech, individual rights,

etc.) and not on the impetuous minds of individuals (Snyder, 2000; de Tocqueville, 2003). In addition, these democratic institutions provide protection and insulation against hostile actions taken by dissatisfied national elites and can help mitigate the damage they might cause (Snyder, 2003, p. 320).

Second, because this approach is more beneficial for national elites, it is more likely to be accepted by them. Elites can gain material wealth from the economic development, and can take advantage of the newly installed government and political structures to advance their power and status. Servant-oriented elites are particularly pleased with this approach because it centers on social justice and ideals. All these factors contribute to a greater probability of cooperation and a smaller likelihood of violence; both are key components in a successful democratic transition.

B. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ELITE

Chapter IV also revealed that national elites play a pivotal role in the democratization process. In every scenario, national elites almost unilaterally determined the outcome of democratization; when national elites supported democratization, it was a success, but when they opposed it, it was a failure. Many scholars have argued that elites are one of the most significant variables in the democratization process (Diamond, 1999, p. 66; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1991) and these findings further confirm that theory.

Therefore, when transitioners are presented with an opportunity to spread democracy to a foreign nation, they should not proceed unless they are reasonably sure they will have the support of the national elites. Transitioners should be especially wary of self-oriented national elites because they pose the greatest threat to a successful democratization. According to the analysis conducted in Chapter IV, transitioners can gain support from national elites using one or both of the following methods.

First, change the utility payouts. Since national elites are rational actors, they make choices and exhibit behaviors that boost their personal satisfaction. When self-oriented national elites choose to reject democratization, they do it because that course of action provides the greater utility payout and the greatest satisfaction. By providing incentives that modify the utility payouts, transitioners can transform the previously undesirable choice of accepting democracy, into a more desirable one. Chapter III identifies that self-oriented national elites are motivated by a compilation of power, acceptance, and status. For incentives to be effective they must focus on these three areas and increase the utility of the targeted actor. Possible options for accommodating elites include powerful positions, public endorsements, or prestigious titles. However, to effectively alter elite behavior, these side payments must total at least seven utility points, an increase in general satisfaction of almost 50 percent! Anything less is not persuasive enough to tip the scales.

A second possibility is to change the elite ratios. As identified in Chapter IV, self-oriented national elites generally reject democratization while servant-oriented national elites generally accept democratization. Furthermore, the presence of servant-oriented national elites, even when outnumbered by self-oriented elites nearly two to one, typically leads to a successful democratic transition. One approach would be to alter the mixture of national elites until the percentage of self-oriented national elites falls below the necessary threshold (65%). This could be done by decreasing the number of self-oriented elites through the employment of golden parachutes or other exile options. Efforts that reduce their power and influence may also be effective. Another approach is to increase the presence of servant-oriented national elites by planting them within the target nation or by working to boost the power and influence of indigenous servant-oriented elites.

When used in combination, these two methods can be even more valuable. As shown in Figure 12, the payouts for national elites change as the mixture of elites changes. As discussed earlier, when only self-oriented national

elites are present in the target nation (100%), an incentive worth seven utility points is required to convince national elites to accept democratization. However, if the percentage of self-oriented elites is reduced to 90%, increasing the percentage of servant-oriented elites to 10%, the required incentive drops to five utility points. The necessary incentive continues to drop by two points for every 10% drop in self-oriented national elites. Therefore, an approach that aims at decreasing the presence of self-oriented national elites while also providing incentives may be the most effective strategy.

Self (X)	Servant (Y)		TD vs. A	TD vs M	BU vs A	BU vs M
0	1		28.00	15.00	25.00	14.00
0.1	0.9		26.80	15.80	23.90	15.30
0.2	0.8		25.60	16.60	22.80	16.60
0.3	0.7		24.40	17.40	21.70	17.90
0.4	0.6		23.20	18.20	20.60	19.20
0.4583	0.5417	+	22.50	18.67	19.96	19.96
0.5	0.5		22.00	19.00	19.50	20.50
0.6	0.4		20.80	19.80	18.40	21.80
0.65	0.35	*	20.20	20.20	17.85	22.45
0.7	0.3		19.60	20.60	17.30	23.10
0.8	0.2		18.40	21.40	16.20	24.40
0.9	0.1		17.20	22.20	15.10	25.70
1	0		16.00	23.00	14.00	27.00

Figure 12. Mixed National Elite Utility Payouts

C. SCENARIOS LIKELY FOR SUCCESS

Based on the results of the partial conflict game, two key factors seem to increase the likelihood of a successful transition to a democratic regime. The first is the presence of servant-oriented national elites. The wants and desires of servant-oriented national elites are closely aligned with those of transitioners. As a result, this normally leads to increased cooperation between the two parties and provides an environment ripe for democracy to take root.

The second factor is the feasibility of incentives. When servant-oriented elites are present in large enough numbers, success is likely. However, when servant-oriented elites possess insufficient influence, transitioners must either resort to incentives or accept failure. The feasibility of these incentives is a critical factor. Those that are powerful enough to alter the behavior of self-oriented elites will likely have a negative effect on the utility of transitioners. For example, offering elites powerful positions within the new government or presenting them with public endorsements prior to elections will probably increase their utility. Unfortunately, it may also damage the electoral process and impede political pluralism. Granting elites special privileges may increase their satisfaction by boosting their status, but it also hampers equality and the rule of law. Overall, such incentives risk undermining the newly established democratic regime, and therefore, incentives of more than a couple points are probably not feasible.

D. THE IRRELEVANCE OF SPEED

When discussing the democratization process, a speedy transition is often a desirable goal. Rapid transitions decrease the amount of capital transitioners must invest, provide benefits sooner, and boost transitioners' reputations within the international system. Furthermore, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that long and laborious transitions can lead to the erosion of domestic support. Intuition demands that speed should be a deciding factor.

Nevertheless, in this exercise speed was not factored into the equation. Transitioners earned no points for executing the transition quickly, and the costs of rapid versus lengthy democratizations were not considered. In spite of these omissions, analysis reveals that the top-down approach, the faster of the two approaches examined, is still preferable. However, this is due to its superiority in other areas, and not because of its relative transition speed. Therefore, when

transitioners consider initiating the democratization process, they should regard speed as irrelevant. By focusing on building a successful democratic regime, the quicker transition will naturally follow.

E. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF STUDY

While this discussion has revealed valuable insights about the democratization process, it has also exposed areas for further study. First, this model is based on an inductive approach that combines conceptual theories from various disciplines to form new theories about the democratization process. A deductive approach using data from various case studies involving democratization could be used to test and validate these findings. This could help determine which of these conceptual theories are supported by fact and which need further refinement.

Second, national elites should receive further study with an emphasis on determining what drives their behavior. This could enable the development of more accurate personality profiles and could lead to the categorization of additional types of national elites. A third or fourth variety of national elites would further alter the dynamics of the democratization process and may provide even more insight into this complicated process.

Third, this model could be expanded to include additional avenues of democratization beyond the simple top-down and bottom-up approaches. In addition, elites could be given more courses of action such as “go into exile” or “ignore transition” to see how these choices affect the likelihood of democratization. This would result in an AxC payout matrix where A represents the number of approaches to democratization and C represents the number of choices available for national elites.

F. FINAL THOUGHTS

When transitioners consider democratizing a target nation, these findings could be incorporated into their planning to improve the overall likelihood of

success. By gathering descriptive data on the national elites present within a target nation, and by tailoring the utility payouts to match the specific objectives of each actor, transitioners can build a predictive model like the one created in this study. Such a model would enable them to test and evaluate the success rates of various approaches to democratization. While the predictions may not be fully validated, they do present transitioners with new outlooks on the problem. Equipped with this additional information, transitioners will be more prepared to spread democracy successfully to a target nation. Through thoughtful application, the United States' goal of global democratization may one day be achieved.

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